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Abstract 
Across four experiments, reliance on rational analysis reduced the correspondence 
between implicit and explicit attitudes relative to reliance on intuition. In each 
experiment, implicit attitudes were measured, and then participants were induced to rely 
on either rational analysis or intuition. Following this manipulation, explicit attitudes 
were measured. We found that participants reported explicit attitudes that were more or 
less consistent with implicit attitudes depending on whether they relied more on intuitions 
or rational analysis. Notably, rational analysis only reduced the correspondence between 
implicit and explicit attitudes when it led participants to consider reasons for their 
attitudes that were inconsistent with their implicit attitudes. In Studies 3 and 4 we found 
that reliance on intuition or rational analysis also affected the correspondence between 
implicit attitudes and behavioral choices. In Study 4 we found that these effects of 
rational analysis and intuition on behavioral choices affected satisfaction with decisions 
three weeks later. 
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Intuition, Rational Analysis and the Relation between Implicit and Explicit Attitudes 
Gertrude belongs to a book club that is set to discuss James Joyce's A Portrait of 
the Artist as a Young Man. Reflecting on the book, she is impressed by its narrative 
techniques, expressionistic writing style, and rich allusions to contemporary Irish issues. 
These deliberatively considered points lead her toward a positive evaluation of the book. 
But as she read the book, she simply did not enjoy it, though she cannot articulate what 
limits her enthusiasm for it. Given these conflicting reactions, how might she arrive at an 
overall attitude toward the book? Would she trust her more immediate, intuitive reaction 
or her more reflective, rational analysis of the book? Would she somehow blend these 
two sources of evaluation together? In the present article, we argue that both intuitive 
reactions and more rational judgments play roles in forming explicit attitudes. Note that 
we use the term rational to refer simply to a more deliberative, reflective mode of 
thinking, not a mode of thinking that is necessarily more logical or unbiased. We present 
evidence that implicit attitudes are experienced as intuitive evaluations, which often form 
the basis of explicit attitudes, though additional deliberative considerations can affect 
explicit attitudes as well. We demonstrate that greater reliance on intuition, relative to 
rational analysis, leads to greater correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes. 
Such reliance can also cause behavioral choices to correspond more closely to implicit 
attitudes; in at least some cases, this leads people to be more satisfied with their 
decisions. 
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes 
The traditional, most common way to determine a person's attitude about 
something is to simply ask him or her (Ajzen, 2001; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Such direct 
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measures may assess reflective, propositional evaluative judgments. These are the 
attitudes that people explicitly endorse. More recent research in social psychology, 
however, has seen the development of indirect, implicit measures, which may assess 
more automatic or reflexive, associative evaluations that people do not necessarily 
endorse as valid (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Traditional 
self-report measures and the new indirect measures are commonly thought of as tapping 
explicit and implicit attitudes, respectively (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). We retain this terminology in the 
present article in order to more clearly link our findings to past research in this area, 
though we acknowledge that these attitudes might be more precisely described as 
deliberate evaluative judgments and immediate evaluative reactions (see Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). 
A major focus of research has been on the degree of association between implicit 
and explicit attitudes (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, 
Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Nosek, 2005). Research examining implicit and explicit attitudes 
has sometimes observed striking dissociations between the two, lending the constructs a 
degree of discriminant validity. Implicit and explicit self-esteem, for example, are 
typically uncorrelated (e.g., Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 1999; Jordan, Spencer, 
Zanna, Hoshino Browne, & Correll, 2003; Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005). Thus, 
people who explicitly report having high self-esteem may show high or low levels of 
implicit self-esteem. Likewise, explicit reports of prejudice do not typically correlate with 
implicit measures of prejudice (e.g., Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008). 
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However, meta-analyses examining implicit and explicit attitudes across a variety 
of attitude domains reveal considerable variability in correlations between the two 
(Hofmann et al., 2005; Nosek, 2005). Overall there is a modest positive correlation 
between implicit and explicit attitudes, but the correlation is quite strong in some 
domains and near-zero in others. These meta-analyses further suggest that significant 
variability in explicit-implicit attitude correspondence is moderated by factors such as 
self-presentational concerns and the spontaneity with which people report their attitudes. 
In domains where people are more concerned with presenting themselves positively, 
there is less correspondence between explicit and implicit attitudes (Nosek, 2005). Self-
presentational concerns may lead people to deliberate on attitudes to a greater extent 
(Fazio & Olson, 2003). In domains for which people report their attitudes more 
spontaneously, relying on their "gut feelings" to a greater extent, there is greater 
correspondence (Hofmann et al., 2005; see also Koole, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 
2001). 
Because the degree of correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes is 
related to important behavioral outcomes and judgments (Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et 
al., 2003, 2005; McGregor & Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 2005; 
Schroder-Abe et al., 2007; Son Hing et al , 2008; Zeigler-Hill, 2006), these findings 
underscore the need to better understand when and under what conditions implicit and 
explicit attitudes correlate with each other (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Two influential models 
of attitudes, the Associative-Propositional Evaluation (APE; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006) model and the Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE; Fazio & 
Olson, 2003; Olson & Fazio 2009) model, make similar predictions in this respect. These 
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models, moreover, are consistent with the moderation of explicit-implicit attitude 
correspondence by self-presentational concerns and the spontaneity of attitude reports. 
APE and MODE Model Predictions 
Although the APE and MODE models make many unique predictions, both 
models predict that, in reporting explicit attitudes, people may rely on their implicit 
attitudes and additional deliberative considerations. In both models, implicit attitudes 
reflect relatively automatic associations between an object and an evaluation. These 
associative evaluations can be translated into more deliberative, propositional evaluations 
(e.g., "I don't like A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man"). One might then simply 
report such an evaluative judgment as one's explicit attitude. One might, however, rely 
on additional, deliberative considerations in forming an explicit attitude (e.g., its 
innovative writing style and rich allusions) if one has the motivation and opportunity (i.e., 
sufficient time and cognitive capacity) to do so. 
Thus, when motivation or opportunity for deliberation are low, explicit and 
implicit attitudes should correspond more closely as one's explicit attitude is more 
directly based on one's implicit attitude. This may be why more spontaneously-reported 
explicit attitudes correspond more closely with implicit attitudes (Hofmann et al., 2005; 
Koole et al., 2001). When motivation and opportunity to elaborate one's initial evaluative 
reaction are high, additional considerations may dilute the influence of implicit on 
explicit attitudes. This may be why explicit and implicit attitudes correspond less closely 
in domains for which self-presentational concerns are high (Nosek, 2005). Notably, the 
APE model specifically posits that additional deliberative considerations will decrease 
the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes only when those 
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considerations are inconsistent with one's implicit attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006). If, however, additional considerations are consistent with implicit attitudes, the 
correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes may remain high. 
Thus, the APE and MODE models suggest that the correspondence between 
implicit and explicit attitudes depends on how much people elaborate their initial, 
associative evaluations of objects (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006; Olson & Fazio, 2009). Both models are consistent with the moderation of explicit-
implicit attitude correlations by the spontaneity with which people report their explicit 
attitudes. There is now some evidence that greater cognitive elaboration of explicit 
attitudes can reduce the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes (Florak, 
Scarabis, & Bless, 2001; Hofmann et al., 2005; Koole et al., 2001; cf. Nosek, 2005). The 
cognitive processes by which these effects occur, however, remain unclear (Hofmann et 
al., 2005). We test critical aspects of these models and the processes underlying them in 
the present studies. 
Consistent with the APE and MODE models, we believe people may often use 
their implicit attitudes as starting points for explicit attitude judgments, and that the two 
will correspond closely when motivation or opportunity to elaborate initial evaluative 
reactions are low. We extend these models, however, in predicting that, 
phenomenelogically, people experience their implicit attitudes as intuitions. We thus 
predict that the more people trust in and rely on their intuitions, the more they will use 
their implicit attitudes in forming evaluative judgments and thus the greater will be the 
correspondence between their implicit and explicit attitudes. The more people rely on 
rational analysis, however, the more they may use additional considerations to form their 
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explicit attitudes, which can dilute the correspondence between implicit and explicit 
attitudes if these considerations are inconsistent with one's implicit attitudes. 
Intuition, Rational Analysis and Implicit-Explicit Attitude Correspondence 
Numerous theorists have suggested that we may experience stored patterns of 
cognitive associations as intuitions (Epstein, 1991; Hogarth, 2001; Lieberman, 2000; 
Sloman, 1996). Implicit learning in general might largely consist of associative cognitive 
processes that are experienced as intuition. People may often be aware of the products of 
efficient, associative processes, but not the cognitive processes underlying them, and in 
this way implicit learning may give rise to a phenomenal experience of intuition (Bowers, 
Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Hogarth, 2001; Reber, 1976; 1989; Seger, 1994). 
Likewise, people may experience implicit attitudes as intuitive evaluations (Jordan, 
Whitfield, & Zeigler-Hill, 2007). That is, when an associative evaluation is activated by 
an attitude object, people may be aware of their immediate evaluative response, but not 
the cognitive processes that produced it. They may thus have difficulty identifying and 
articulating the cognitive processes that produce their implicit evaluative responses. 
Experientially, they may seem to "pop" into one's head and thus be experienced as 
intuitions or gut feelings. 
Indeed, some evidence does suggest that people may experience implicit attitudes 
as intuitions. The extent to which people trust their intuitions moderates the 
correspondence between implicit and explicit self-esteem (Jordan, Whitfield, & Zeigler-
Hill, 2007). In two studies, we measured the extent to which people perceive their 
intuitions to be valid (i.e., their Faith in Intuition; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Rej & Heier, 
1996) and found that correlations between implicit and explicit self-esteem were higher 
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for people who perceived their intuitions to be generally valid. In another two studies, we 
experimentally induced some participants to trust their intuitions to a greater extent, by 
suggesting that people who trust their intuitions are more successful in business and 
social relationships. We found that people induced to trust their intuitions reported 
explicit self-esteem that corresponded more closely to their implicit self-esteem. These 
findings suggest that people experience their implicit self-esteem as intuitive evaluations 
of the self, and to the extent that they trust their intuitions, rely on their implicit self-
esteem to a greater extent in reporting their explicit self-esteem. In the present studies, we 
generalize these findings to attitudes other than self-esteem. This is crucial, as self-esteem 
may behave quite differently than other attitudes (Kernis, 2005), reflecting in particular 
"the impact of carefully pondered propositions and of self-presentational concerns" 
(Rudolph et al., 2008, p. 279). 
The APE and MODE model formulations of the relation between implicit and 
explicit attitudes are further supported by recent experimental evidence (Gawronski & 
LeBel, 2008). Gawronski and LeBel manipulated implicit attitudes (e.g., toward Pepsi 
and Coke) through associative conditioning. They also manipulated whether participants 
were instructed to focus on feelings or reasons for their evaluations when reporting their 
explicit attitudes toward the same attitude objects. They found that evaluative 
conditioning affected implicit attitudes regardless of whether participants focused on 
feelings or reasons, but that it affected explicit attitudes only when participants focused 
on feelings when reporting their attitudes. This produced stronger correlations between 
implicit and explicit attitudes when participants focused on feelings rather than reasons. 
Consistent with the APE and MODE models, these findings suggest that evaluative 
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conditioning changes implicit attitudes, which can then inform explicit attitudes if 
participants focus primarily on their feelings, but not if they focus on other more 
deliberative considerations. 
The present research aims to complement and extend these findings and to further 
test the possibility that reliance on intuition increases the correspondence between 
implicit and explicit attitudes, whereas rational analysis decreases this correspondence. 
Although Gawronski and LeBel's findings are consistent with this formulation, they 
measured both implicit and explicit attitudes after their evaluative conditioning 
procedure. It is thus difficult to rule out the possibility that a focus on feelings amplified a 
direct effect of evaluative conditioning on explicit attitudes, rather than this change being 
mediated by changes to implicit attitudes. In the present studies, we do not focus on 
attitude change per se, but concentrate on the extent to which reliance on intuition or 
rational analysis causes explicitly reported attitudes to correspond more or less closely 
with implicit attitudes. We do so by first measuring implicit attitudes and then 
manipulating the extent to which people rely on intuitions or rational analysis in reporting 
their explicit attitudes. In this way, we can be sure that changes in the correspondence 
between implicit and explicit attitudes reflect changes in explicitly reported attitudes. 
We expect that greater reliance on intuition will lead people to report explicit 
attitudes that are more consistent with their implicit attitudes, and that greater reliance on 
rational analysis will lead people to report explicit attitudes that are less consistent with 
their implicit attitudes, at least to the extent that rational analysis leads people to rely 
more heavily on considerations that are inconsistent with their implicit attitudes. Such 
findings would meaningfully extend the results of Jordan et al. (2007) while 
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demonstrating that their findings generalize beyond implicit self-esteem to implicit 
attitudes in general. In addition, in Studies 3 and 4, we extend our analysis to examine 
how reliance on intuition or rational analysis affects the correspondence between implicit 
attitudes and behavioral choices. 
Wilson and colleagues found across a number of studies that introspection 
changes (explicit) attitudes (see Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989), and can reduce the 
quality of decisions (Wilson et al., 1993; Wilson, Hodeges, & LaFleur, 1995; Wilson & 
Kraft, 1993). Wilson et al. (1989) note that thinking about reasons for one's attitudes can 
change explicit attitudes because it can lead one to focus on a biased subset of reasons. In 
our view, thinking about reasons reduces the extent to which implicit attitudes determine 
explicit attitudes by leading people to recruit additional considerations, some of which 
may contradict implicit attitudes. In addition, behavioral choices that occur soon after a 
reasons analysis are likely to conform more to the changed explicit attitude (Wilson et al., 
1989), and less to implicit attitudes. However, in the absence of continued rational 
analysis, one's implicit attitudes may reassert themselves in determining responses to the 
attitude object over time, causing people to be less satisfied with decisions that are made 
soon after a reasons analysis. This may be because rational analysis can sometimes lead 
people to underemphasize or ignore aspects of objects that are actually quite 
consequential in how they respond to them in daily interactions, and to overemphasize 
aspects that are not very important. We explore these possibilities in Studies 3 and 4 by 
examining how reliance on intuition versus rational analysis affects the relation between 
implicit attitudes and behavioral choices, and how this translates into later decision 
satisfaction. 
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Study 1 
In Study 1 we tested the influence of reliance on intuition and reliance on rational 
analysis on the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes. We examined 
attitudes toward television shows as an attitude domain that should be relatively familiar 
to participants. We predict that a focus on intuition will lead explicitly reported attitudes 
to correspond more closely to implicit attitudes than a focus on rational analysis. Notably, 
we expect this to occur only when rational analysis leads people to rely on considerations 
that are inconsistent with their implicit attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). If, 
however, rational analysis leads people to focus on additional considerations that support 
their implicit attitudes, then it should not reduce the correspondence between implicit and 
explicit attitudes. We examined this possibility in an exploratory manner in Study 1. 
Specifically, we examined comparisons between television shows that belong to the same 
genre and comparisons of shows that belong to different genres, positing that these 
different kinds of comparisons would lead participants to recruit qualitatively different 
kinds of reasons for their preferences. If, for example, Susie prefers the show Friends to 
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, when thinking deliberatively about her preference, she 
might reason that she prefers comedies to crime dramas, or values humor in shows more 
than suspense, a preference that aligns with her preference for specific shows. In 
considering her preference for Friends over Frasier, however, she may need to "dig 
deeper" than attributes based on a simple genre preference, because both shows are 
comedies. In this case, she may need to consider additional aspects of the plot and 
characters that are more likely to contradict her preference for Friends. 
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Television shows are commonly categorized on the basis of genre. Different 
shows are classified in TV Guide according to different genres, and Emmy Awards are 
awarded to shows in different genre categories such as comedy, drama, and variety. 
Perceptions of similarities between objects or concepts that are categorized similarly and 
differences between objects or concepts that are categorized differently tend to be 
accentuated (Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Tajfel, 1957; 1959). As a 
consequence, comparisons between members of different categories are naturally 
differentiated on the basis of a salient category distinction. Because some genre 
distinctions for television shows (e.g., the distinction between dramas and comedies) are 
commonly-used, we expected that deliberative comparisons between television shows 
that are within-genre may be quite different than comparisons between television shows 
that cross genres. 
If one must consider their preference between two shows that belong to different 
genres, they may readily perceive differences between the shows based on the genre 
distinction itself as reasons for their preference. Because the genre preference is aligned 
perfectly with their preference between the two shows, the reasons they recruit to support 
their preference will be largely consistent with their initial evaluative reaction, or implicit 
attitude. Consequently rational analysis will not reduce the correspondence between 
implicit and explicit attitudes in this case. If, on the other hand, the two shows belong to 
the same genre, then people can no longer rely simply on a genre distinction to support 
their preference and will need to consider additional, more content-based factors when 
comparing the two shows. The greater the number of factors they consider, in this case, 
the greater the likelihood that some of these factors will contradict their implicit 
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preference, thus diluting the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes. 
Thus, in Study 1, we predicted that rational analysis would disrupt the correspondence 
between implicit and explicit attitudes for a within-genre comparison between television 
shows but not for a cross-genre comparison. 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-nine undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses participated in 
exchange for course credit. One participant's data were lost due to computer error. We 
also excluded the data of participants with error rates over 20% on either of the two 
implicit measures (described below) from analyses involving the measure in question. 
Three participants had high error rates on both implicit measures, making the final 
sample 95 participants (23 male). Five additional participants had high error rates on one 
or the other of the implicit measures and their data were excluded only from analyses 
involving that measure. 
Procedure 
Up to eight participants at a time participated in sessions, though they were seated 
at individual workstations and did not interact with each other. Participants were met by a 
female experimenter who described the study as an investigation of "the psychology 
behind popular television shows." Participants first completed two implicit measures 
regarding their attitudes toward three television shows. We then induced participants to 
trust either intuition or rational analysis. This was followed by explicit measures of their 
attitudes toward the television shows. Lastly, participants completed a manipulation 
check testing their degree of trust in intuition and in rational analysis. 
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Implicit attitudes toward television shows. Participants completed two Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998) measures of implicit 
attitudes toward three television shows: Friends, Frasier, and CSI: Crime Scene 
Investigation, two comedies and one drama, respectively. One IAT measured the extent 
to which participants associated Friends more than Frasier with positive affect, and the 
other measured the extent to which they associated CSI more than Friends with positive 
affect. Thus, we examined one within-genre comparison and one cross-genre comparison, 
respectively. 
In the Friends vs. Frasier IAT, participants categorized words and images, as 
quickly as possible, along two dimensions, respectively. Words were categorized as 
pleasant or unpleasant (i.e., holiday, warmth, nice, smile, sunshine, gift, love, happy, 
party, joy; agony, death, disease, vomit, evil, cockroach, pain, stink, disaster, garbage). 
Images were categorized as Friends or Frasier (i.e., pictures of the characters: Rachel, 
Ross, Joey, Monica, and Chandler from Friends; and Frasier, Niles, Daphne, Martin, and 
Eddie-the-dog from Frasier). These images were retrieved from network websites. The 
target stimuli appeared in the center of the screen, and the category labels appeared in the 
upper left and right corners of the screen, corresponding to the response keys (e and /) 
used to indicate category membership. There were seven blocks of trials in the first IAT. 
Within each block, stimuli were presented in random order. 
Blocks 1, 2, and 5 were practice blocks (20 trials each) for which participants 
made single categorizations. In Block 1 words were categorized as unpleasant or 
pleasant, and in Block 2 images were categorized as Friends or Frasier. In the remaining 
blocks, participants made both sets of categorizations, on alternate trials, using a single 
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set of response keys. In Block 4, participants used one response key to indicate if a 
stimulus belonged to the unpleasant or Friends categories and the other key if the 
stimulus belonged to the pleasant or Frasier categories (40 trials). In Block 5, 
participants categorized images as Frasier or Friends with the response keys now 
reversed. In Block 7, participants used one response key to indicate if a stimulus 
belonged to the unpleasant or Frasier categories and the other key if the stimulus 
belonged to the pleasant or Friends categories (40 trials). Blocks 3 and 6 were practice 
blocks (20 trials each) for Blocks 4 and 7, though data from these blocks were used in 
calculating IAT scores (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). 
The scoring of the Friends vs. Frasier IAT was premised on the logic that 
individuals with strong implicit preference for Friends over Frasier should respond faster 
when Friends and pleasant share a response than when Friends and unpleasant share a 
response, because the positive semantic association with Friends should facilitate 
responding in the former pairing but interfere with responding in the latter pairing. This 
facilitation effect serves as an index of implicit preference for Friends over Frasier. We 
calculated IAT scores using the algorithm advocated by Greenwald et al. (2003), with 
higher scores indicating more positive implicit attitudes toward Friends. 
The second IAT compared the shows CSIvs. Friends. Using images from these 
shows, the procedures for this IAT were identical to the first IAT except that participants 
were presented with only the four blocks corresponding to Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7. This IAT 
was scored so that higher scores reflected more positive implicit attitudes toward CSI 
relative to Friends. We counterbalanced the order of the two IATs. Half of the 
participants received the order described above; the remaining half completed the CSIvs. 
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Friends I AT first. For participants in this latter condition, the CSIvs. Friends I AT 
included the full seven blocks and the Friends vs. Frasier IAT included only four blocks. 
This order manipulation did not affect any of the dependent measures and so is not 
discussed further. We calculated split-half reliabilities for the two IATs using separate 
scores for the critical blocks (Blocks 4 and 7) and the practice blocks (Blocks 3 and 6). 
This revealed that each IAT had acceptable, albeit somewhat low, levels of reliability 
(Spearman-Brown coefficients = .56, and .63, respectively). 
Manipulation of the perceived validity of rational analysis or intuition. After the 
implicit measures, we induced participants to trust either rational analysis or intuition 
(following Jordan et al., 2007). We did so by having participants make a series of 
decisions either rationally or intuitively. Half of the participants were told that, "There is 
clear evidence that people who adopt a rational approach to decision making are more 
successful in many areas of their lives." Such individuals were said to excel in business, 
be popular, and have more successful romantic relationships. The remaining participants 
were told that "people who adopt an intuitive approach to decision making" are more 
successful. We told participants that we were interested in why rational (or intuitive) 
decision makers are more successful, and that we wanted to see how well they made such 
decisions. To this end, they were shown a series of fictitious personality profiles and were 
asked to decide whether they would live with each person in a co-ed house. They were 
asked to make decisions either rationally or intuitively, depending on condition. 
Participants in the rational condition were encouraged to decide carefully, to write 
down each consideration and why they felt it was important. They were encouraged to 
list pros and cons. Participants in the intuitive condition were instead encouraged to use 
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gut feelings to decide, relying on how they felt overall about each person. They were 
asked to work quickly and not think too much about their decisions. All participants then 
saw seven personality profiles presented by computer, four of which were male. Each 
profile included a short written description and a photograph of the individual. Profiles 
included information that most people would likely deem to be relevant to deciding (e.g., 
the person's agreeableness, responsibility, or finances), as well as information that would 
likely be more peripheral (e.g., the person's hobbies, tastes in movies, or career 
aspirations). For example, one profile indicated that "Trent treats everyone with the 
utmost respect and decency," and that he "spends his weekends with his competitive 
bowling team." Participants indicated whether they would accept each individual as a 
housemate. Although the instructions to be intuitive or rational applied only to the 
hypothetical roommate selection task, we expected our manipulation of general trust in 
intuition or rational analysis would carry over into subsequent tasks (cf. Mussweiler, 
2001). 
Explicit attitudes toward televisions shows. Following the manipulation, 
participants indicated their explicit liking for Friends, Frasier, and CSI by rating their 
agreement with three statements for each (e.g., "I like CSI," "CSI is a good show," "I 
enjoy watching CS7"). Responses ranged from 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree). Difference 
scores were computed to reflect relative preferences for shows; that is, Friends over 
Frasier and CSI over Friends (Cronbach's a = .98, and .97, respectively), to be consistent 
with our implicit attitude measures (see Nosek, 2005). 
Manipulation check. Finally, participants completed the short form of the Rational 
Experiential Inventory (REI), including subscales measuring Need for Cognition and 
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Faith in Intuition (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Participants were asked to, "Please answer 
according to how you feel right now at this moment. Do not worry about what you are 
generally like or how you might have felt in the past." We could thus assess whether our 
manipulation affected Faith in Intuition and Need for Cognition. For the Need for 
Cognition subscale, respondents rated their agreement with twelve items such as, "I have 
a logical mind," "I enjoy problems that require hard thinking," and "I am not a very 
analytical thinker" (reversed). For the Faith in Intuition subscale, respondents rated their 
agreement with twelve items such as, "I suspect my hunches are often inaccurate" 
(reversed), "If I were to rely on my 'gut feelings,' I would often make mistakes" 
(reversed), and "I like to rely on my intuitive impressions." Responses were made on 5-
point scales ranging from 1 {definitely not true of myself) to 5 {definitely true of myself). 
These subscales showed good reliability (Cronbach's a = .81 for Need for Cognition and 
.86 for Faith in Intuition). Scores on the items for each subscale were averaged together. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check. Following the manipulation, participants reported more 
Need for Cognition in the rational condition {M= 3.66, SD = .53) than in the intuitive 
condition {M= 3.34, SD = .58), / (93) = 2.85, p < .01. Participants also reported more 
Faith in Intuition in the intuitive condition (M= 3.70, SD = .56) than the rational 
condition (M= 3.30, SD = .54), t (94) = -3.46,p < .001. 
Rational analysis and implicit-explicit correspondence. Across the entire sample, 
we found modest positive correlations between implicit and explicit attitudes toward 
television shows {Friends vs. Frasier, r = .36, p < .001; CSIvs. Friends, r = 34, p < 
.001). We expected that the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes would 
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be greater in the intuitive than in the rational condition for the within-genre comparison 
of Friends vs. Frasier. To test this possibility, we first conducted a multiple regression 
analysis predicting explicit attitudes toward Friends vs. Frasier from the corresponding 
IAT scores (centered), experimental condition (effect coded: rational condition = 1, 
intuitive condition = -1), and their interaction term (Aiken & West, 1991). There was a 
main effect of implicit attitudes on explicit attitudes (fi = .36), / (89) = 3.70, p < .001, but 
not of condition on explicit attitudes, (fi= -.06), t (89) = -.68,/? = .50. As predicted, the 
correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes was moderated by experimental 
condition (fi = -.74), t (89) = -1.79,/? = .08, albeit marginally. The sign of this interaction 
was negative, indicating that the relation between implicit and explicit attitudes was 
lower for those in the rational condition, relative to the intuitive condition (see Figure 1). 
As can be seen in Figure 1, there was a significant positive relation between IAT scores 
and explicit attitudes for Friends vs. Frasier in the intuitive condition (fi = .53), t (89) = 
3.91,/? < .001, but not the rational condition (fi = . 18), t (89) = 1.34,/? - .18. 
The same analysis was conducted for the comparison of CSIvs. Friends, but as 
predicted the interaction here was not significant, (/? = -.10), t (87) = -.28,/? = .78. There 
was a main effect of implicit attitudes on explicit attitudes ifi = .34), / (89) = 3.41,/? < 
.001, but not of condition on explicit attitudes, {fi = -.04), t (89) = -.42,/? = .67. This 
suggests that rational analysis might not disrupt the correspondence between implicit and 
explicit attitudes for cross-genre comparisons, as we predicted. This finding supports the 
possibility that the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes will only be 
disrupted by deliberative, cognitive elaboration if the additional considerations brought to 
bear on an explicit attitude are inconsistent with one's implicit attitude. In the case of 
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cross-genre comparisons, there is a salient difference between the television shows that is 
aligned with one's preference. In this case, additional considerations are more likely to be 
aligned with one's implicit preference and so the correspondence between implicit and 
explicit attitudes is not diluted. 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1. We specifically 
wanted to further explore the differences observed for cross-genre and within-genre 
comparisons of television shows, and to generalize them by examining a different within-
genre comparison. The results of Study 1 support the notion that rational analysis reduces 
the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes only when it leads people to 
consider factors that are inconsistent with their implicit attitudes. In Study 2, we sought 
more direct support for this possibility. We did so by having participants in the rational 
condition report the considerations that they relied on when reporting their explicit 
attitudes toward the television programs. We expected that participants would rely 
primarily on genre-based reasons when comparing shows that belong to different genres. 
Because these reasons are likely to align with their implicit preferences, they should not 
disrupt the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes. In the case of within-
genre comparisons, we expected participants to report more content-based reasons which 
were more likely to contradict their implicit attitudes. We thus coded participants' 
reasons according to whether they were consistent or inconsistent with their implicit 
attitudes. We expected more inconsistent reasons to be reported for within-genre 
comparisons than cross-genre comparisons. For either type of comparison, we expected 
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participants who reported more inconsistent reasons, and fewer consistent reasons, would 
demonstrate less correspondence between their implicit and explicit attitudes. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-three undergraduates enrolled in business courses participated in exchange 
for $8 Canadian. We excluded four participants with error rates over 20% on both of the 
IATs. Results are reported for the remaining 59 participants (18 males). However, we 
again excluded individual IAT scores with error rates over 20% from relevant analyses. 
Thus, analyses comparing Law & Order vs. CSI exclude 10 participants with high error 
rates and, likewise, analyses comparing Friends vs. CSI exclude 4 participants. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Study 1 with three exceptions. We examined the 
pairings, Friends vs. GS7 and Law & Order vs. CSI as the cross-genre and within-genre 
comparisons, respectively. Second, participants indicated their explicit attitudes toward 
the television shows by indicating their relative preference for each pairing, rating their 
agreement with three statements for each (e.g., "Friends is a good show relative to CSI," 
"I like Friends more than CSI," and "I enjoy watching Friends more than CSF). This 
change allowed us to examine whether the results of Study 1 would replicate when the 
explicit measures were direct measures of relative preferences for the shows (as in the 
current study) rather than indirect measures of preferences constructed from attitude 
ratings for each show. They also allowed us to more easily examine the reasons for 
participants' preferences. Thus, following the explicit attitude measures, participants in 
the rational condition were asked: "When you compared Friends vs. CSI [Law & Order 
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vs. GST], what factors were important for your judgment?" These questions had an open-
ended response format. Participants in the intuitive condition were not asked these 
questions because they had been discouraged from engaging in rational analysis. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. Participants again reported more Faith in Intuition in the 
intuitive condition (M= 3.37, SD = .41) than the rational condition (M= 2.96, SD = .57), 
t (57) = 3.09, p < .01. However, the manipulation appeared to primarily target Faith in 
Intuition, because there was no difference in reported Need for Cognition between the 
rational condition (M= 3.75, SD = .62) and the intuitive condition (M= 3.76, SD - .53), t 
(57) = 0.07,/? = .94. 
Rational analysis and implicit-explicit correspondence. Across the entire sample, 
we again found modest positive correlations between implicit and explicit attitudes 
toward television shows {Law & Order vs. CSI, r = .34, p < .01; Friends vs. CSI, r = .28, 
p < .05). We expected that for the within-genre comparison (Law & Order vs. CSI), the 
correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes would be greater in the intuitive 
than in the rational condition, as found in Study 1. To test this possibility, we conducted 
multiple regression analyses predicting explicit attitudes from IAT scores, experimental 
condition, and their interaction. There was a main effect of implicit attitudes on explicit 
attitudes (J3 = .36), t (45) = 2.71, p = .01, but not of condition on explicit attitudes, (ft = -
.20), t (45) = -1.09,/? = .28. The interaction was significant (fi = -.51), t (45) = -2.90, p = 
.01, with a negative sign indicating that the relation between implicit and explicit 
attitudes was lower for those in the rational condition than the intuitive condition. As can 
be seen in Figure 2, there was a significant positive relation between IAT scores and 
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explicit attitudes for Law & Order vs. CSI in the intuitive condition (fi = .45), t (45) = 
4.09,p < .001, but not the rational condition (fi = -.02), t (45) = -0.13,/? = .90. 
We conducted the same multiple regression analysis to test whether the 
correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes for Friends vs. CSI was greater in 
the intuitive condition than the rational condition. As in Study 1, the interaction did not 
predict explicit attitudes for the cross-genre comparison, (fi = -.08), t (51) = -.51, p = .57. 
There was a main effect of implicit attitudes on explicit attitudes (fi = .28), t (51) = 2.11, 
p = .04, but not of condition on explicit attitudes, (fi = .03), t (51) = .19, p = .85. 
Analysis of reasons reported in the rational condition. We expected that 
participants in the rational condition were likely to focus primarily on reasons that are 
related to the genre difference in the cross-genre comparison. Thus, rational analysis 
might not dilute the correspondence between implicit and explicit preferences for cross-
genre comparisons because the genre difference is aligned with implicit preferences 
between the television shows (e.g., a preference for Friends over CSI is likely aligned 
with a preference for comedies over dramas). In contrast, for within-genre comparisons, 
people may be more likely to recruit additional, content-based considerations that are 
more likely to be inconsistent with implicit preferences, thus diluting the correspondence 
between implicit and explicit attitudes. We thus expect more reasons that are inconsistent 
with implicit attitudes to be listed for the within-genre than for the cross-genre 
comparison. In addition, we expect the proportion of inconsistent relative to consistent 
reasons that participants list will decrease the correspondence between implicit and 
explicit attitudes. 
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To test these predictions, we had two independent raters count the number of 
reasons listed by each participant. Inter-rater reliabilities for the number of reasons listed 
by each participant and for the coding of reasons as consistent or inconsistent with 
implicit attitudes, were acceptable (a's = .81 & .94, respectively) and differences were 
resolved by discussion. Based on centered IAT scores, each reason was then categorized 
as consistent or inconsistent with participants' implicit attitudes. Reasons such as "I find 
CSI more interesting because I really loved biology in high school", and "Law & Order is 
overly dramatic and not as original in plot and character as CST\ were coded as 
consistent if the IAT showed a preference for CSI over Law & Order (i.e., they had a 
score below zero on the Law & Order vs. CSITAT), but as inconsistent if they had an 
implicit preference for Law & Order (i.e., a score above zero). As predicted, the within-
genre comparison, Law & Order vs. CSI, had more inconsistent reasons listed (51%) than 
the cross-genre comparison, CSI vs. Friends (11%). 
We also examined whether the number of consistent reasons relative to 
inconsistent reasons moderated the relation between implicit and explicit attitudes toward 
Law & Order vs. CSI. We reasoned that more consistent reasons relative to inconsistent 
reasons would be associated with greater correspondence between implicit and explicit 
attitudes. We calculated an index of the predominance of consistent relative to 
inconsistent reasons by subtracting the number of inconsistent reasons from the number 
of consistent reasons for each participant. Higher numbers thus reflect more consistent 
than inconsistent reasons. We then regressed explicit attitudes toward Law & Order vs. 
CSI onto this consistency index (centered), implicit attitudes toward Law & Order vs. 
CSI (centered), and their interaction. There was neither a main effect of implicit attitudes 
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on explicit attitudes {fi = .16), t (21) = .12, p = .48, nor of the consistency of reasons on 
explicit attitudes, (fi = .37), / (21) = 1.67,/? = .11. The interaction of the consistency of 
reasons and implicit attitudes was significant, (fi = .43), t (21) = 2.12, p = .05. There was 
a marginally significant positive relation between IAT scores and explicit attitudes for 
Law & Order vs. CSI for participants who listed many consistent reasons (+ 1 standard 
deviation above the mean) (fi = .58), t (21) = 1.79, p = .08, but not for participants who 
listed many inconsistent reasons (-1 standard deviation below the mean) (fi = -.27), t (21) 
= -1.02,/? = .32, though the direction of the relation was negative in this case. 
We also examined whether the number of consistent reasons moderated the 
relation between implicit and explicit attitudes toward CSI vs. Friends. Although, as 
expected, there were far fewer inconsistent reasons listed for this cross-genre comparison, 
we would still expect that people who list many consistent relative to inconsistent reasons 
would show more correspondence between their implicit and explicit attitudes for this 
comparison, relative to those who list more inconsistent reasons. We again calculated an 
index of the predominance of consistent relative to inconsistent reasons. We then 
regressed explicit attitudes toward CSI vs. Friends onto this consistency index (centered), 
implicit attitudes toward CSI vs. Friends (centered), and their interaction. There was 
neither a main effect of implicit attitudes on explicit attitudes {fi = .12), t (22) = .70,/? = 
.49, nor of consistency of reasons on explicit attitudes, (/? = -.04), t (22) = -22, p = .83. 
The interaction of consistency of reasons and implicit attitudes was significant, {fi = .60), 
t (22) = 3.19,/? < .01. There was a significant positive relation between IAT scores and 
explicit attitudes for Law & Order vs. CSI for participants who listed many consistent 
reasons (+1 standard deviation above the mean) {fi = .79), t (22) = 3.29,/? < .01, but a 
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marginally negative relation for participants who listed many inconsistent reasons (-1 
standard deviation below the mean) (ft = -.55), t (22) = -1.84, p = .08. This latter effect 
should be taken as somewhat tentative, however, as few participants listed many 
inconsistent reasons for this cross-genre comparison. 
Taken together, these results provide support for the APE and MODE models of 
the relation between implicit and explicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes may often form the 
basis for explicit attitudes, particularly when people are focused on their intuitions or gut 
feelings. To the extent that they engage in cognitive elaboration, or rational analysis, of 
their attitudes, however, the additional considerations they bring to bear on their explicit 
attitudes may dilute the extent to which implicit attitudes determine explicit attitudes. We 
specifically found that the more reasons people recruit that are inconsistent with their 
implicit attitudes, the lower is the correspondence between their implicit and explicit 
attitudes. This provides unique evidence for an important aspect of the APE model. 
Notably, when people primarily recruit reasons that support their implicit attitudes—as in 
the case of cross-genre comparisons of television shows—then rational analysis does not 
reduce the influence of implicit on explicit attitudes. 
Study 3 
We predict that reliance on intuition increases the correspondence between 
implicit and explicit attitudes and that rational analysis decreases it. In Studies 1 and 2, 
we found evidence that reliance on intuition leads to closer correspondence between 
implicit and explicit attitudes than does reliance on rational analysis, but were unable to 
determine if this effect reflects the influence of reliance on intuition, reliance on rational 
analysis, or both. Thus, in Study 3 we included a neutral baseline condition, in which 
Rational Analysis, Intuition, and Attitudes 26 
participants were not induced to rely on either intuition or rational analysis, against which 
to compare the effects of rational analysis and intuition. This is particularly important as 
the effects of rational analysis specifically have not previously been tested. We 
previously found that an increased reliance on intuition brings explicit self-esteem into 
closer correspondence with implicit self-esteem relative to a baseline condition (Jordan et 
al., 2007, Study 4), but this study did not include a condition that increased reliance on 
rational analysis. Thus, the present study promises the first direct evidence that an 
increased reliance on rational analysis can lead people to report explicit attitudes that are 
less consistent with their implicit attitudes. 
In Study 3 we also expand our analysis to consider how reliance on rational 
analysis or intuition might affect behavioral choices. In an impressive program of 
research, Wilson and colleagues documented how thinking about reasons for one's 
attitudes can change those attitudes (Wilson et al., 1989). Thinking about reasons can also 
change behaviors that are enacted soon after thinking about reasons. In one study, for 
example, Wilson et al. (1993) had some participants think about reasons for their 
preferences between various art and humor posters. Although control participants who 
did not think about reasons preferred the art posters in this study, those who thought 
about reasons preferred the humor posters more and were more likely to choose to keep a 
humor poster. As Wilson et al. note, thinking about reasons can lead participants to focus 
on a biased subset of reasons that are salient, accessible, and easily verbalized, causing 
poster choices to change. 
In our view, thinking about reasons may often lead people to change their explicit 
attitudes to be less consistent with their implicit attitudes. We expect that participants in 
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Wilson et al.'s study had implicit attitudes that favored the art posters, but that thinking 
about reasons led to a predominance of reasons that favored the humor posters. 
Subsequently participants' behavioral choices were also less consistent with their implicit 
attitudes. We explore this possibility in the present study by examining participants' 
attitudes toward art and humor posters. This focus also generalizes the results of Studies 
1 and 2 to a new attitude domain. 
Notably, we expect reliance on intuition and rational analysis to change the 
correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes in this study despite the fact that 
the comparisons in question cross "genre" categories (comparing art and humor posters). 
Although we found in Studies 1 and 2 that rational analysis did not reduce the 
correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes toward television shows that 
belonged to different genres, the categorization of posters as humor or art posters is less 
familiar and common than the classification of television shows as dramas or comedies. 
With little or no prior experience thinking about posters in terms of art and humor 
categories, participants should be less likely to draw on this category distinction when 
considering their preferences for specific art and humor posters. We thus expect rational 
analysis to reduce the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes in this case. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-two undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses 
participated in exchange for course credit. We excluded eight participants with error rates 
over 20% on the IAT. The final sample was thus 114 participants (37 male). 
Procedure 
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Up to eight participants at a time participated in sessions, though they were seated 
at individual workstations and did not interact with each other. Participants were met by a 
female experimenter who described the study as an investigation of "decision-making 
and poster preferences," and gestured to a wall in the lab on which hung two traditional 
art posters (Nympheas et branches saules by Monet and Les Irises de Saint-Remy by Van 
Gogh) and two contemporary humor posters (a dog smoking with the caption "It doesn't 
get any better!" and a dog wearing glasses and apparently reading with the caption "It 
only hurts when I study"). Participants completed an IAT of preference for art posters 
over humor posters. We then induced participants to trust either intuition or rational 
analysis. We also included a control condition in which participants were given no 
instructions for thinking about their preferences. This was followed by a measure of 
explicit attitudes and a hypothetical choice measure in which participants indicated which 
of the four posters they would choose to take home with them if given the choice. 
Implicit attitudes toward posters. Participants completed an IAT measure of 
implicit preferences for the art posters over the humor posters. This IAT was identical to 
those administered in Studies 1 and 2, except that participants categorized images of the 
four individual posters using the category labels "Art Poster" and "Humor Poster". We 
calculated IAT scores using the algorithm advocated by Greenwald et al. (2003), with 
higher scores indicating stronger implicit preferences for art posters (Spearman-Brown 
coefficient = .79). 
Manipulation of the perceived validity of rational analysis or intuition. After the 
measure of implicit attitudes toward the posters, we induced participants to trust intuition 
or rational analysis as in Studies 1 and 2. In this study, however, we also included a 
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control condition in which participants were not guided to make decisions either 
rationally or intuitively. This manipulation differed from the manipulation used in the 
previous studies in that participants did not evaluate potential roommates but were 
instead directed to make judgments about the posters either rationally, intuitively, or with 
no specific instructions. 
Although the general manipulation of reliance on intuition or rational analysis 
used in Studies 1 and 2 may provide a particularly compelling test of our hypotheses in 
that it does not directly target the attitudes in question, but only a general focus on 
intuition or rational analysis, it is not a central part of our hypotheses. Thus, in Study 3, 
we opted for a more direct manipulation and had participants think more rationally or 
intuitively about the specific attitudes under study; this should provide a more powerful 
and direct test of our predictions. Participants in the rational condition were encouraged 
to think carefully about their reasons for liking or disliking each poster and to consider 
how important each reason was to them. They were encouraged to think about the pros 
and cons of each poster. Participants in the intuitive condition were encouraged to rely on 
their intuitions and report how they felt about the posters overall. They were asked to 
work quickly and not think too much about their judgments. Participants in the control 
condition were asked simply to "use whatever information seems most relevant to you." 
Explicit attitudes toward posters. Following the manipulation, participants viewed 
images of each of the four posters and rated their liking for each one ("How much do you 
like this poster?"). Response options ranged from 1 {strongly dislike) to 5 {strongly like). 
The rating scores for the two art posters were averaged together, as were the rating scores 
for the two humor posters, and mean humor poster ratings were subtracted from mean art 
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poster ratings. This created an index of explicit preference for art posters over humor 
posters, with higher scores reflecting a stronger preference for the art posters. 
Hypothetical poster choice. Participants were also asked to make a hypothetical 
decision. They were asked, "If you could have one of the posters, which one would you 
choose?" Images of each of the four posters were presented simultaneously on the 
Computer monitor and were linked to four response keys. We coded a choice of an art 
poster as 1 and a choice of a humor poster as 0. 
Results and Discussion 
Explicit attitudes. Implicit and explicit attitudes toward the posters correlated 
significantly across the entire sample (r = .55, p < .001). In order to test whether our 
manipulation of trust in rational analysis or intuition affected the correspondence between 
implicit and explicit attitudes toward posters, we conducted a multiple regression analysis 
predicting explicit attitudes toward posters from IAT scores (centered) and two coded 
vectors representing the experimental conditions (dummy coded: rational = 0, 0; intuitive 
= 1,0; and control = 0, 1). Interaction terms for the IAT and condition variables were 
also entered in the model. There was a main effect of implicit attitudes on explicit 
attitudes (fi = .30), t (108) = 2.32, p = .02, but not of condition on explicit attitudes, (/9s = 
-.09 and -.13), ts (108) = -1.45 and -1.03, ps > .15. As predicted, the interaction was 
significant, i?2-change = .05, F (2, 108) = 4.25, p = .02 (see Figure 3). As can be seen in 
Figure 3, there was a strong positive relation between implicit attitudes and explicit 
attitudes in the control condition (/? = .53), t (108) = 4.07, p < .001. The association was 
lower in the rational condition (/? = .30), / (108) = 2.32, p = .02, a significant decrease 
from the control condition, t (108) = -2.43, p = .02. The association between implicit and 
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explicit attitudes was highest in the intuitive condition (J3 = .86) t (108) = 6.09,/? < .001, a 
significant increase from the control condition, t (108) = 2.64,/? = .01. Thus, notably, this 
study provides evidence that both reliance on intuition and reliance on rational analysis 
affect the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes. It provides the first 
evidence that rational analysis can decrease this correspondence relative to a neutral 
baseline condition. 
Hypothetical poster choice. We conducted a parallel logistic regression analysis 
to examine the effect of condition and implicit attitudes on hypothetical poster choices. 
There was no main effect of condition on poster choice (b = -.03), Wald's = .01,/? = .92, 
but there was a significant main effect of implicit attitudes on poster choice (b = -1.81), 
Wald's = 17.57,/? < .001. We expected, however, that the hypothetical poster choice 
would correspond with implicit attitudes less in the rational condition and more in the 
intuitive condition, relative to the control condition. Consistent with this prediction, the 
interaction was significant, Nagelkerke's i?2-change = .04, F(2, 108) = 3.30,/? = .04. The 
correspondence between implicit attitudes and poster choice was marginally higher in the 
intuitive condition than in the control condition (b = 1.72), Wald's = 3.37,/? = .07, and 
nonsignificantly lower in the rational condition than in the control condition (b = -.91), 
Wald's = 1.91,/? = .17. The correspondence between implicit attitudes and choice was 
higher in the intuitive condition than in the rational condition, (b = 2.63), Wald's = 3.16, 
p = .07. Although the effects of condition on the correspondence between hypothetical 
poster choice and implicit attitudes were consistent with our predictions, they were not as 
strong as the results for explicit attitudes. 
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Mediation analysis. We were also interested in whether the effect of condition 
and implicit attitudes on hypothetical poster choices (though somewhat weak) might be 
mediated by explicit attitudes. That is, we posit that reliance on rational analysis leads 
explicit attitudes to be less consistent with implicit attitudes, relative to reliance on 
intuition. Behavioral choices are then determined by these changed explicit attitudes 
more than implicit attitudes. We thus tested a mediated moderation model (following 
Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) to determine whether the interaction effect of implicit 
attitudes and condition on poster choice is mediated by explicit attitudes. To conduct this 
analysis we excluded the control condition and examined the interaction of condition and 
implicit attitudes predicting poster choice, controlling for the main effects of implicit 
attitudes and condition. This interaction was marginally significant (b = 1.31), Wald's = 
3.16,/? = .07. Next, we tested the effect of the interaction, controlling for main effects, on 
the proposed mediator, explicit attitudes. This interaction effect was significant (fi = .29), 
t (69) = 3.19,/? < .01. We then tested the effect of explicit attitudes on choice, controlling 
for implicit attitudes, condition, and their interaction, as well as the interaction of explicit 
and implicit attitudes (following Muller et al , 2005). The effect of explicit attitudes on 
choice was significant (b = .69), Wald's = 9.06,p < .01. Moreover, controlling for 
explicit attitudes and the interaction of explicit and implicit attitudes, the interaction 
effect of implicit attitudes by condition on choice was reduced to nonsignificance (b = 
.77), Wald's = .86,/? = .28. These results suggest that the effect of implicit attitudes and 
condition on poster choice is mediated by explicit attitudes. 
Study 4 
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In Study 4, we sought to replicate the findings of Study 3 with real choice 
behavior rather than hypothetical choices. Although the results of Study 3 were consistent 
with our predictions, particularly in the significant interaction between implicit attitudes 
and reliance on intuition or rational analysis on hypothetical poster choices, some key 
contrasts were only marginally significant. This may be because hypothetical choices are 
less engaging to participants than actual choices would be. We thus examined actual 
behavioral choices in Study 4 as they may provide a more powerful and realistic test of 
our predictions. Accordingly, we conducted a more direct replication of Wilson and 
colleagues' original poster study, giving participants a choice of a poster to keep. In 
doing so, we also conducted a follow-up survey to examine the effects of rational 
analysis and intuition on subsequent satisfaction with their poster choices. Wilson and 
colleagues found that participants who thought about reasons were more likely to change 
their explicit poster preferences and the poster they chose to keep. Specifically, they 
found in their study that participants who thought of reasons preferred humor posters 
more and were more likely to keep a humor poster. They were also subsequently less 
satisfied with their choices. We did not expect this specific pattern of attitude change (in 
the direction of humor posters), because we did not pretest stimuli specifically to elicit an 
initial preference for art posters, as Wilson and colleagues did. But we did expect 
participants who engaged in rational analysis to change their explicit attitudes to be less 
consistent with their implicit attitudes and to choose posters less consistently with their 
implicit attitudes. We also expected them to ultimately be less satisfied with their 
choices. 
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Wilson and colleagues theorized that when people think about reasons, they may 
shift their attitudes to be more predominantly cognitively-based than affectively-based. 
This focus on cognitive factors in determining attitudes causes attitude change in the 
immediate situation. However, the effect of this altered attitude and focus on cognitively-
based factors may often be temporary because over time the affective bases of attitudes 
may reassert themselves and determine responses to attitude objects to a greater extent. 
Thus, preferences for posters may normally be predominantly affectively-based, but 
rational analysis may lead people to rely to a greater extent on cognitive factors. Thus, 
after thinking about reasons, they will report more cognitively-based attitudes and make 
choices that are more consistent with these attitudes. Over time, however, the cognitive 
factors may recede in importance and responses to the posters may be predicted more by 
one's affective responses to them. 
We believe that this model can be usefully framed in terms of implicit and explicit 
attitudes. As already noted, we posit that implicit attitudes are experienced as intuitions 
or gut feelings that are primarily affectively-based. Explicit attitudes, in contrast, can be 
more cognitively based, particularly when one has engaged in rational analysis, or 
thinking about reasons. In our view, rational analysis can lead people to change their 
explicit attitudes to be less consistent with their implicit attitudes. They may then choose 
posters more consistently with their changed explicit attitudes, and less consistently with 
implicit attitudes. Over time, however, implicit attitudes may determine responses to the 
posters to a greater extent, leading to less satisfaction with poster choices if people 
engaged in rational analysis prior to choosing. This model is consistent with Wilson et 
al.'s model though it is framed in somewhat different terms. It has the advantage, 
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however, of allowing measures of initial implicit, or affectively-based attitudes, which 
their studies did not include, allowing a more complete test of the model. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-two undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses participated in 
exchange for course credit. We excluded eight participants with error rates over 20% on 
the IAT. An additional seven participants' data were excluded because they could not be 
contacted to follow up on their post-choice satisfaction (following Wilson et al., 1993); 
inclusion of these data did not appreciably change the pattern of results for the attitude 
and choice measures. Results are reported for the remaining 57 participants (17 male). 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Study 3 with the following exceptions: Only one 
art poster (Van Gogh) and one humor poster (the smoking dog) hung on the wall and 
were the target stimuli for the attitude measures. The IAT and explicit attitude measures 
examined attitudes toward these two posters but were otherwise the same as in Study 3. 
For the IAT, participants categorized images (five images taken from sections of each 
poster) as either "Van Gogh poster" or "Doesn't Get Better poster". Both the IAT and the 
explicit measures were coded such that higher scores reflected greater preference for the 
art poster over the humor poster. The manipulation was the same as in Study 3, except 
that a control condition was not included in order to simplify the design. Finally, 
following the measures of explicit attitudes, participants chose one of the two posters to 
keep. Approximately three weeks later, we contacted participants to assess their 
satisfaction with their choice. 
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Behavioral poster choice. Participants were asked to choose one of the two 
posters to take home with them. They were told, "before you go I have a surprise for you. 
The professor in charge of this study likes to give participants a small gift as thanks for 
participating. This time he was able to obtain copies of the posters in this study from the 
manufacturer. You may choose one of the posters to take home with you," (following 
Wilson et al., 1993, p. 334). There were several copies of each poster stacked on a table 
and after participants took a poster and left the lab, the experimenter recorded which 
poster they chose. A choice of the art poster was scored as 1, a choice of the humor poster 
was scored as 0. 
Post-choice satisfaction. At the beginning of the session, participants were 
informed that this study involved a brief phone-call from the experimenter following up 
on their experiences. Participants received a phone call from the experimenter 
approximately three weeks after their session (M= 21.00 days, SD = 7.21). The 
experimenter reminded participants of the reason for the call and proceeded to ask 
participants questions about the study (adapted from Wilson et al., 1993). First, 
participants were asked if they still had the poster (confirmed by reporting the name of 
the manufacturer on the poster). Participants were asked whether they had hung the 
poster on their wall. They were then asked whether they intended to take it with them 
when they went home for the summer. Participants were asked how much money it 
would now cost to buy the poster from them. Finally, participants were asked to rate how 
much they now liked the poster on a 10-point scale (1 = dislike very much and 10 = like 
very much). Following Wilson and colleagues,, we averaged participants' responses to 
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these five items into a single measure of post-choice satisfaction (Cronbach's a = .75). 
We first standardized the continuous measures. 
Results and Discussion 
Across the entire sample, implicit and explicit attitudes toward the two posters 
correlated highly (r = .68, p < .001). In order to test whether our manipulation of rational 
analysis affected the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes toward the 
posters, we conducted a multiple regression analysis predicting explicit attitudes toward 
the posters from IAT scores (centered), condition (rational or intuitive), and their 
interaction. The main effect of implicit attitudes on explicit attitudes was significant {fi = 
.70), t (53) = 6.91, p< .001, but the main effect of condition on explicit attitudes was not 
(/? = .02), t (53) = .22, p = .83. As predicted, the interaction was significant (ft = -.20), t 
(53) = -2.03, p < .05. The sign of this interaction was negative, indicating that the relation 
between implicit and explicit attitudes was lower for those in the rational condition, 
relative to the intuitive condition. As can be seen in Figure 4, there was a strong positive 
relation between implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes in the intuitive condition (/? = 
.90), t (53) = 6.16,/? < .001. The association between implicit and explicit attitudes was 
lower in the rational condition (fi = .49), t (53) = 3.54,/? < .01. Thus, a significant relation 
between implicit and explicit attitudes was found in both conditions, though the 
correspondence was significantly lower in the rational condition. 
Behavioral poster choice. To test whether participants in the rational condition 
showed less correspondence between implicit attitudes and behavioral choice, we 
conducted a logistic regression predicting choices from implicit attitudes, condition and 
their interaction. As in Study 3, we did not find a main effect of condition on poster 
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choice (b = -.14), Wald's = .28, p = .60. There was also no significant main effect of 
implicit attitudes on poster choice {b = .95), Wald's = 2.45, p = . 12, although it 
approached significance. More pertinently, as predicted, the interaction between IAT and 
condition was significant (b = -1.43), Wald's = 5.53, p = .02. As Figure 5 shows, the 
correspondence between implicit attitudes and poster choice was significantly positive in 
the intuitive condition (b = 2.39), Wald's = 5.88, p = .02, suggesting that poster choices 
were based on implicit preferences. By contrast, the correspondence between implicit 
attitudes and poster choice was non-significant in the rational condition (b = -.48), 
Wald's = .44, p =.51. 
Mediation analysis. We again tested a mediated moderation model consistent with 
the interactive effect of implicit attitudes and condition on poster choice being mediated 
by explicit attitudes. As mentioned above, the interaction of implicit attitudes and 
condition significantly predicted choice (the dependent variable) and explicit attitudes 
(the mediator). We also tested the effect of explicit attitudes on choice, controlling for 
implicit attitudes, condition, and their interaction, as well as the interaction of explicit and 
implicit attitudes (following Muller et al., 2005). The effect of explicit attitudes on choice 
was marginally significant (b = .23), Wald's = 2.81,/> = .09. Moreover, controlling for 
explicit attitudes and the interaction of explicit and implicit attitudes, the interaction 
effect of implicit attitudes by condition on choice was reduced to marginal significance (b 
= -1.16), Wald's = 3.29, p = .07. These results are consistent with the possibility that the 
effect of implicit attitudes and condition on choice is mediated by changes in explicit 
attitudes. 
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Post-choice satisfaction. Consistent with Wilson et al.'s (1993) findings, 
participants were less satisfied with their chosen poster in the rational condition (M= -
.21; SD = .13) than the intuitive condition (M= .24; SD = .12), (J3 = -.31), t (55) = -2.46, p 
< .02 (also see Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). 
Finally, to test whether the findings of post-choice satisfaction are explained by 
the particular poster that participants chose and participants' implicit attitudes toward that 
poster, we conducted a multiple regression analysis predicting post-choice satisfaction 
from implicit attitudes and poster choice (effect coded: humor poster chosen = -1; art 
poster chosen = 1). We expected that participants who chose consistently with their 
implicit preference would ultimately be more satisfied with their choice. This should 
occur regardless of whether participants were in the intuitive or rational condition, though 
as we have already demonstrated, those in the intuitive condition were more likely to 
choose consistently with their implicit preferences. As predicted, we found a significant 
interaction between implicit attitude and poster choice predicting post-choice satisfaction, 
t (53) = 3.00, p < .01. As Figure 6 shows, participants who chose the art poster tended to 
be more satisfied to the extent that their implicit preference for the art poster was 
stronger, J (53) = 1.61,/? = . 11. In contrast, participants who chose the humor poster were 
less satisfied with their choice to the extent that their implicit preference for the art poster 
was stronger, t (53) = -2.53, p = .01. We also included condition in this analysis, 
including its main effect and higher-order interactions with implicit attitudes, choice, and 
both; only a main effect of condition on post-choice satisfaction was found (as described 
above). Thus, condition did not moderate the results of this analysis. 
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Taken together, these findings suggest that rational analysis led participants to 
focus on more aspects of the art and humor posters that were inconsistent with their 
implicit preferences. Relative to relying on intuition, rational analysis led participants to 
report explicit attitudes that diverged more from their implicit attitudes. Consequently, 
participants who engaged in rational analysis were more likely to choose posters that 
diverged from their implicit attitudes. Lastly, to the extent that participants chose a poster 
that was inconsistent with their implicit preferences, they were ultimately less satisfied 
with their choice. 
General Discussion 
We found across four experiments that a reliance on rational analysis reduces the 
correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes relative to a reliance on intuition. 
In each experiment, we first measured implicit attitudes and then manipulated the extent 
to which participants relied on rational analysis or intuition, before measuring explicit 
attitudes. This allowed us to observe the extent to which reliance on rational analysis or 
intuition caused changes in explicit attitudes that brought them more or less into line with 
implicit attitudes. We found that reliance on rational analysis, relative to intuition, 
decreased the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes, to the extent that 
the considerations introduced by rational analysis were inconsistent with implicit 
attitudes. Notably, in Study 3, we found that, relative to a baseline condition, reliance on 
rational analysis decreased the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes and 
reliance on intuition increased this correspondence. In Studies 3 and 4 we found that 
reliance on intuition or rational analysis also affected the correspondence between 
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implicit attitudes and behavioral choices. Finally in Study 4, we found that this effect on 
behavioral choices affected satisfaction with decisions three weeks later. 
These findings provide novel support for two influential models of the relations 
between implicit and explicit attitudes, the APE and MODE models (Fazio & Olson, 
2003; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Olson & Fazio 2009). Both models posit that 
implicit attitudes form the basis of explicit attitudes, but that cognitive elaboration can 
reduce the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes as additional 
considerations are integrated into explicit attitude reports. In keeping with these models, 
we found that people reported explicit attitudes that were less consistent with implicit 
attitudes when they thought deliberatively about the reasons for their preferences. We 
found in particular that the effect of deliberation on explicit attitudes occurred when 
analysis led people to consider reasons that contradicted their implicit attitudes, 
consistent with APE model predictions. We also extend the APE and MODE models, 
however, by predicting that implicit attitudes are experienced as intuitions. When our 
participants relied to a greater extent on their intuitions, they reported explicit attitudes 
that were more consistent with their implicit attitudes, suggesting that they increased their 
reliance on implicit attitudes when reporting explicit attitudes. 
A notable aspect of our findings is thus that both reliance on rational analysis and 
intuition can affect the extent to which explicit attitudes correspond with implicit 
attitudes. In Study 3, we included a neutral baseline condition in which participants were 
not instructed in how to formulate their explicit attitudes. Relative to this condition, 
greater reliance on rational analysis decreased the correspondence between implicit and 
explicit attitudes and greater reliance on intuition increased this correspondence. In 
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earlier studies, we demonstrated that greater reliance on intuition increases the 
correspondence between implicit and explicit self-esteem (Jordan et al., 2007). The 
present studies thus generalize this effect to other attitude domains, which is noteworthy 
because self-esteem may often behave differently than other attitudes (see Kernis, 2005). 
In addition, in this earlier work, we did not specifically test whether rational analysis 
reduces the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes relative to a baseline 
condition. Study 3 thus provides the first evidence of this effect. 
Another notable aspect of our findings is that not all rational analysis decreased 
the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes. The APE model specifically 
posits that cognitive elaboration, or rational analysis, may dilute the influence of implicit 
attitudes on explicit attitudes to the extent that it leads people to consider factors that 
contradict their implicit attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). In Studies 1 and 2 
we found that rational analysis decreased the correspondence between implicit and 
explicit attitudes for within-genre comparisons of television shows but not cross-genre 
comparisons. We hypothesized that people would primarily recruit reasons that were 
genre-based in cross-genre comparisons and that these reasons would mainly be 
consistent with their implicit preferences. In contrast, for within-genre comparisons, we 
expected people to recruit more content-based reasons that were more likely to be 
inconsistent with their implicit preferences. Indeed, in Study 2 we found that participants 
in the rational condition reported more reasons that were inconsistent with their implicit 
attitudes for within-genre than cross-genre comparisons. The number of inconsistent 
reasons participants reported relative to consistent reasons, moreover, moderated the 
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correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes. When participants reported more 
inconsistent than consistent reasons, there was less correspondence. 
Thus our results not only demonstrate that reliance on rational analysis or 
intuition affects the correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes, but they also 
speak to the mechanisms underlying these effects. Extending past work (e.g., Gawronski 
& LeBel, 2008), we demonstrate that changes to the correspondence between implicit and 
explicit attitudes can specifically reflect changes to explicit attitudes as people focus to a 
greater extent on their intuitions or engage in more rational analysis. We demonstrate, 
moreover, that the considerations brought to bear on explicit attitudes through rational 
analysis are important. If these considerations are consistent with implicit attitudes, then 
rational analysis will not reduce the correspondence between implicit and explicit 
attitudes, and may even increase it. If, however, rational analysis leads people to consider 
factors that contradict their implicit attitudes, their explicit attitudes are likely to become 
less consistent with their implicit attitudes. These studies thus provide novel evidence for 
a number of critical aspects of the relation between implicit and explicit attitudes, which 
are consistent with the APE and MODE models. 
Thinking About Reasons, Attitudes, and Behavioral Choices 
These studies may also shed new light on earlier research demonstrating that 
thinking about reasons can change (explicit) attitudes and reduce satisfaction with 
decisions (Wilson et al., 1989). Wilson and colleagues found that thinking about reasons 
can change attitudes, particularly affectively-based attitudes. They posited that thinking 
about reasons for attitudes can lead people to consider a biased subset of possible reasons 
that are salient, accessible, and easily verbalized. People may then change their attitudes 
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to be more consistent with this set of reasons, which entails a shift toward attitudes that 
are more cognitively based. We replicate these effects in the present studies, and suggest 
that Wilson et al.'s model may be usefully framed in terms of implicit and explicit 
attitudes. Implicit attitudes, we suggest, may be primarily affectively based, in the sense 
that people experience their immediate evaluative reactions to attitude objects as 
intuitions or gut feelings without clear ties to supporting reasons. As they recruit reasons, 
people will often consider reasons that contradict their implicit attitudes, leading their 
explicit, more cognitively based attitudes to diverge from them (see Wilson et al., 1989 
for consideration of why people may recruit inconsistent reasons). 
Wilson et al. also found that changed attitudes can affect behaviors that are 
enacted soon after thinking about reasons. Thus, participants who had thought about 
reasons for their preferences between art and humor posters were more likely to choose 
humor posters than were participants who had not thought about reasons (Wilson et al., 
1993). Their participants were, however, less satisfied with their decisions three weeks 
later. We found parallel effects. When people carefully considered the reasons for their 
preferences between art and humor posters, their poster choices were less consistent with 
their implicit attitudes. Participants in Study 4 were also less satisfied with their choices 
three weeks later, if they had engaged in rational analysis before choosing. We found 
specifically that participants who chose a poster that was inconsistent with their implicit 
preferences were less satisfied with their choice. 
Wilson et al. note that, "When people think about reasons, the cognitions that 
become salient may determine people's attitude reports and their initial behavior. As they 
continue to interact with the attitude object, however, their basic affective reaction to it is 
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more likely to reassert itself, thereby driving their behavior in a way that is likely to be 
inconsistent with their previously stated, cognitively based attitude" (p. 302; italics in 
original). In our view, implicit attitudes reflect initial affective reactions to attitude 
objects, in this case posters. When people think rationally about their attitudes, however, 
they may incorporate reasons that are inconsistent with their implicit preferences into 
their explicit attitudes. The resultant attitudes then diverge from implicit attitudes, and 
may influence behaviors enacted soon after rational analysis. But, over time, as the 
reasons recede from attention, more ingrained implicit attitudes may again determine 
responses to attitude objects. Thus, when people make decisions that run counter to their 
implicit attitudes, they may often be less satisfied with these decisions over time. 
This model is consistent with Wilson et al.'s model, but the present studies may 
provide a more fine-grained test of these ideas. In Wilson and colleagues' studies, they 
did not measure participants' initial, affectively-based attitudes, instead demonstrating 
attitude change by showing differences in reported attitudes between participants who 
thought about reasons and those who did not (Wilson & Dunn, 1986; Wilson et al., 1984; 
Wilson et al., 1988; see Wilson et al., 1989). By using implicit measures to gauge more 
affectively-based attitudes, we are able to demonstrate that engaging in rational analysis 
can lead to explicit attitudes that are less consistent with implicit attitudes. Wilson et al. 
similarly looked for behavioral differences resulting from thinking about reasons, and 
measured the extent to which behavior corresponded with reported attitudes. In the 
present studies, we were able to demonstrate that behavioral choices enacted soon after 
rational analysis are less consistent with implicit attitudes. In addition, we specifically 
demonstrated that people are less satisfied with their decisions three weeks later to the 
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extent that they chose posters that were inconsistent with their implicit preferences. Our 
results thus support Wilson et al.'s model, and also link it in a novel way to recent work 
on the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes. 
Affectively-based and Cognitively-based Attitudes 
This refraining of Wilson et al.'s work may also suggest more widespread 
parallels between implicit and explicit attitudes on the one hand, and affectively-based 
and cognitively-based attitudes on the other (e.g., Breckler, 1984; Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc 
& Markus, 1982). Affectively-based attitudes are viewed as having a strong affective 
component without being clearly tied to supporting beliefs, whereas cognitively-based 
attitudes are based more directly on conscious beliefs. The more recent distinction 
between implicit and explicit attitudes may parallel this earlier distinction in many ways 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson et al., 2000). Both distinctions have advanced 
theory, allowing more accurate prediction of attitudinal ambivalence and persuasion 
effects (Conner & Armitage, 2008; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Petty, Tormala, Brinol, & 
Jarvis, 2006), of the attitude-behavior relation (Millar & Tesser, 1986; Olson & Fazio, 
2003), and in suggesting that one type of attitude can sometimes influence the other 
(Whitfield & Jordan, 2009; Wilson et al., 1989). Both affectively-based and implicit 
attitudes appear to be particularly susceptible to conditioning (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2001; 
Gibson, 2008; Walther, 2002; Zanna, Kiesler, & Pilkonis, 1970). In addition, explicit 
attitude measures that focus on affect correlate more strongly with implicit attitudes than 
do measures that include a stronger cognitive component (Nosek, 2005). Thus, as we 
have done here, it may be profitable to revisit effects that have been interpreted in terms 
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of the distinction between affectively- and cognitively-based attitudes with implicit and 
explicit attitudes in mind. 
This is not to suggest that any implicit construct will be affectively based and that 
any explicit construct will be cognitively based. Work on the distinction between implicit 
prejudice and implicit stereotyping suggests, for example, that people can demonstrate 
implicit race bias both affectively and cognitively, and that the two are separable 
constructs (Amodio & Devine, 2006). The important distinction between implicit and 
explicit constructs may thus be whether they are associative or propositional in nature 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), rather than affective or cognitive. Indeed, implicit 
attitudes may be based on earlier rational consideration of attitude objects (e.g., Whitfield 
& Jordan, 2009); the evaluative summary of these considerations may simply be stored 
associatively without clear connections to the reasons on which they were based. 
Whether an implicit construct reflects a belief or feeling, we expect it to be experienced 
as intuition. In the case of attitudes, as they have been so far conceptualized and 
measured, implicit attitudes reflect associations between attitude objects and positive and 
negative affect. In this way, we believe they correspond closely to affectively-based 
attitudes. 
Relations to Unconscious Thought 
Recent evidence suggests that distracting people from thinking consciously about 
decisions can improve the quality of those decisions (see Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006). In another study that was based on Wilson et al. (1993), Dijksterhuis and van 
Olden (2005) had participants choose between various art and humor posters. They found 
that participants who first viewed the posters and were then distracted from thinking 
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about them chose posters that they were ultimately more satisfied with than participants 
who thought carefully about the posters. Dijksterhuis and colleagues have found similar 
results across a variety of decision making contexts (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, 
Smith, van Baaren, & Wigboldus, 2005; Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2005). The 
superiority of deciding after distraction from the decision problem in these studies has 
been attributed to unconscious thought or "unconscious processing dealing with a 
problem while consciousness is directed elsewhere" (Dijksterhuis & van Olden, 2005, p. 
628). Unlike conscious thought, unconscious thought may be less biased by unduly 
weighting factors that are salient, accessible, and easily verbalized (consistent with the 
model of Wilson et al., 1993). 
There are clear similarities between our findings and those of Dijksterhuis and 
colleagues. We both find that conscious, rational analysis can contribute to less satisfying 
decisions. They find, however, that carefully considered decisions can be less satisfying 
relative to a distraction condition (as was also the case in Wilson et al., 1993), whereas 
we find that carefully considered decisions can be less satisfying relative to focusing on 
intuition. Although speculative, we suggest that distraction from a decision may not be 
critical for unconscious processing to improve decisions. Our participants focused on 
their preferences and thought consciously about them, but focused in particular on gut 
feelings and holistic judgments. Our results may thus provide preliminary support for the 
contention that intuitions are "summary judgments the unconscious provides when it is 
ready to decide" (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006, p. 106), and may suggest that implicit 
attitudes often reflect these summary judgments. Thus, focusing on intuitions may put 
people in better touch with the products of unconscious thought. Alternatively, the 
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unconscious thought that occurs when people are distracted and not actively thinking 
about decisions may put people into better touch with their intuitions. These are 
possibilities worth exploring in future research. We suggest, furthermore, that implicit 
attitude measures may provide a useful tool in further testing how unconscious thought 
affects decisions. 
Conclusions 
The present studies contribute in a number of ways to our understanding of how 
implicit and explicit attitudes relate to each other. Consistent with the APE and MODE 
models, implicit attitudes may form the basis of explicit attitudes, but the correspondence 
between the two may be reduced by cognitive elaboration or rational analysis. We found 
that people reported explicit attitudes that were consistent with their implicit attitudes 
when they focused on their intuitions, but reported explicit attitudes that were less 
consistent with implicit attitudes when they engaged in rational analysis. This latter effect 
was particularly pronounced when rational analysis led people to consider factors that 
were inconsistent with their implicit attitudes. These findings further suggest that people 
experience their implicit attitudes as intuitions. Thus, rather than being unconscious, 
people may have conscious experiences of implicit attitudes in the form of intuitions or 
gut feelings. We also found that rational analysis can lead people to behave in ways that 
are less consistent with their implicit attitudes, and in some cases this may lead to less 
satisfying decisions. These studies thus contribute substantially to an understanding of 
how implicit attitudes are experienced and how they relate to explicit attitudes and 
behavior. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Study 1: Explicit attitudes for Friends vs. Frasier as a function of condition 
(rational or intuitive) and corresponding implicit attitudes (IAT scores; higher scores 
indicate a stronger preference for Friends). Predicted values are displayed for one 
standard deviation above and below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
Figure 2: Study 2: Explicit attitudes for Law & Order vs. CSI as a function of condition 
(rational or intuitive) and corresponding implicit attitudes (IAT scores; higher scores 
indicate a stronger preference for Low & Order). Predicted values are displayed for one 
standard deviation above below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
Figure 3: Study 3: Explicit attitudes for art vs. humor posters as a function of condition 
(rational, intuitive, or control) and corresponding implicit attitudes (IAT scores; higher 
scores indicate a stronger preference for art posters). Predicted values are displayed at 
one standard deviation above below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
Figure 4: Study 4: Explicit attitudes for the art vs. humor poster as a function of 
condition (rational or intuitive) and corresponding implicit attitudes (IAT scores; higher 
scores indicate a stronger preference for art posters). Predicted values are displayed at 
one standard deviation above and below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
Figure 5: Study 4: Poster choice (art poster = 1, humor poster = -1) as a function of 
condition (rational or intuitive) and implicit attitudes toward art vs. humor posters (IAT 
scores; higher scores indicate a stronger preference for art posters). Predicted values are 
displayed at one standard deviation above and below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
Figure 6: Study 4: Post-choice satisfaction as a function of poster choice (art poster = 1, 
humor poster = -1) and implicit attitudes toward art vs. humor posters (IAT scores; higher 
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scores indicate a stronger preference for art posters). Predicted values are displayed at 
one standard deviation above and below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
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Figure 1: Study 1: Explicit attitudes for Friends vs. Frasier as a function of condition 
(rational or intuitive) and corresponding implicit attitudes (IAT scores; higher scores 
indicate a stronger preference for Friends). Predicted values are displayed for one 
standard deviation above and below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
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Figure 2: Study 2: Explicit attitudes for Law & Order vs. CSI as a function of condition 
(rational or intuitive) and corresponding implicit attitudes (IAT scores; higher scores 
indicate a stronger preference for Law & Order). Predicted values are displayed for one 
standard deviation above below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
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Figure 3: Study 3: Explicit attitudes for art vs. humor posters as a function of condition 
(rational, intuitive, or control) and corresponding implicit attitudes (IAT scores; higher 
scores indicate a stronger preference for art posters). Predicted values are displayed at 
one standard deviation above below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
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Figure 4: Study 4: Explicit attitudes for the art vs. humor poster as a function of 
condition (rational or intuitive) and corresponding implicit attitudes (IAT scores; higher 
scores indicate a stronger preference for art posters). Predicted values are displayed at 
one standard deviation above and below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
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Figure 5: Study 4: Poster choice (art poster = 1, humor poster = -1) as a function of 
condition (rational or intuitive) and implicit attitudes toward art vs. humor posters (IAT 
scores; higher scores indicate a stronger preference for art posters). Predicted values are 
displayed at one standard deviation above and below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
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Figure 6: Study 4: Post-choice satisfaction as a function of poster choice (art poster = 1, 
humor poster = -1) and implicit attitudes toward art vs. humor posters (IAT scores; higher 
scores indicate a stronger preference for art posters). Predicted values are displayed at 
one standard deviation above and below the mean of implicit attitudes. 
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